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In early 2010, the ‘Orange Revolution’ in the Ukraine came to an end. The pro-Western
President, Viktor Yushchenko, was replaced by the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych. This
paper argues that Russian energy sanctions helped pave the way for Yanukovych’s election.
The Kremlin undermined the Ukrainian economy by exploiting the country’s dependence
on Russian oil and gas, imposing harsh price increases and ﬁnancial terms and even cutting
off supplies in 2006 and 2009. In the end, I argue, these measures ﬁt the ‘classic model’ of
economic sanctions: impose pain until the population turns against its government and
removes it. Uniquely, however, this paper links sanctions to the long-standing literature on
elections in the U.S. and other democracies which shows how economic decline inﬂuences
voting behavior. A certain level of sanctions may cause a predictable change in election
outcomes in the targeted state. This opens, I believe, an important new potential avenue in
research on sanctions.
Copyright  2013, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction and theory
A large literature in International Relations has focused
on economic sanctions. The ‘classic model’ of sanctionst al. (2007). This is of
success; recently, for
tions,’ which target a
re the general popu-
’Sullivan (2003).
ee the bibliography
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arch Center, Hanyang
sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Haasserts that they usually work by causing economic pain to
the target state’s population.1 The population then reacts
by pressuring the country’s leaders or overthrowing them
outright, thus changing the target state’s international
behavior.
Surprisingly, the extensive literature on economic
sanctions and their effectiveness has not made use of
another key literature in Political Science: the numerous
studies in the ﬁelds of American and Comparative Politics
linking economic performance and electoral outcomes.
Many detailed quantitative studies have shown that eco-
nomic performance is one of the best predictors for
electoral results in the United States and other de-
mocracies.2 For example, in one classic article Gregory
Markus estimates that each 1% rise in per capita dispos-
able income in the year before an election raises the vote
for a US Presidential incumbent by 1.9% (Markus,
1988:146). Similarly, Robert Erickson asserts that a 1%
income increase results in an increase of 2.77% in an in-
cumbent’s vote (Erikson, 1989:568). The relationship isnyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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for example, a recent study of post-WWII election results
shows that a 1% change in income produces a 2% change
in party vote in national elections (Bartool & Sleg, 2009).
A 2006 article on Turkish elections between 1950 and
2004 shows similar results (Akarca & Tamsel, 2006).
Innumerable other studies could be cited, analyzing
elections from Britain to Japan.
Yet the sanctions literature, which as noted also relies
on the idea that “economic pain will lead to leadership
change,” has generally ignored such studies, which could
offer important insights on the crucial question of how
much pain is needed to effect change. It may be that this
failure to link to well-established models is due to the
fact that IR scholars do not read literature from other
subﬁelds of Political Science. Yet there is a more legiti-
mate reason: most past economic sanctions have been
imposed against non-democratic regimes. The USSR,
North Korea, Cuba, Libya, Iraq under Saddam Hus-
seindnone of these regimes permitted free elections, so
inﬂuencing elections was not a realistic mechanism for
sanctions success. The aim of sanctions was instead to
weaken the target state, and if possible provoke a rev-
olution. However, with democracy now far more com-
mon in the world than in previous decades, it is well
worth considering how fully (or even partially) free
elections can be inﬂuenced by the economic pain
inﬂicted by sanctions. This is potentially a rich area for
future research, especially for researchers with a quan-
titative bent, since this literature suggests that economic
decline will damage an incumbent leader’s re-election
chances in speciﬁc, predictable ways.
This paper will attempt to apply these insights to a
recent case of economic sanctions: Russia’s efforts to in-
ﬂuence the Ukraine by using energy sanctions. First, it will
brieﬂy review the situation in the country when the pro-
Western leader of the Orange Revolution, Viktor Yush-
chenko ﬁrst took power. As we shall see, his rule seemed
precarious from the start. The country was highly vulner-
able to Russian sanctions, and Yushchenko’s victory had
been so narrowdand his own coalitionwas so fragiledthat
even a modest economic downturn would seem likely to
put his re-election in doubt. As we shall see, he instead
faced an economic tidal wave. Predictably, his poll num-
bersdand re-election chancesdplunged. Finally, the paper
will brieﬂy examine the resulting 2010 electoral victory of
Russia’s champion, Viktor Yanukovych. As we shall see, the
country’s economic decline was related to the election re-
sults almost exactly as elections theorists such as Markus
and Erickson would predict. The link between sanctions
and the election results was further conﬁrmed after the
election, when Yanukovych promptly rewarded the
Kremlin for its support by changing many of Yushchenko’s
key policies. In return, Russian energy sanctions were
greatly eased.3 See for example Bamaceda (1998) and D’Anieri (1999). For a more
general overview of Moscow’s ‘energy power,’ see for example Stulberg
(2007), Goldman (2008), and Newnham (2011).2. Ukraine and Russia: a legacy of dependence
Russia’s ability to use energy to sanction Ukraine is
rooted in the Soviet period, as was noted by analysts well
before the Orange Revolution.3 The USSR was designed to
bring together its various component parts, the national-
ities represented in the Union Republics. The Soviet lead-
ership was well aware that Ukraine had declared its
independence during the 1917–21 Civil War which fol-
lowed the Russian revolution. It was also well aware that
many Ukrainians had initially welcomed the German in-
vaders in WWII as liberators. Accordingly, many measures
were taken to bind the Ukraine to the Soviet state. As part
of the effort to build a uniﬁed national economy, all of the
Union Republics were linked to Russian oil and gas pipe-
lines. Since most, such as Ukraine, lacked their own re-
sources, this effectively made them totally dependent on
the Kremlin.4 This dependence was deepened since each
Republic came to specialize in the production of certain
goods for sale to the all-Union market. Such products were
often uncompetitive on the world market, meaning that if
Russia failed to buy them, no one else would. And with the
availability of cheap oil and gas, these producers were
encouraged to specialize in energy-intensive pro-
ductsdsuch as petrochemicals and heavy industrial
products.
After the fall of the USSR, such industries would
obviously be highly vulnerable to Russian energy price
increases: even a modest increase could make them un-
competitive. This could easily throw many thousands of
Ukrainians out of work. Furthermore, consumers in
Ukraine also became accustomed to cheap Russian en-
ergy. For example, like most apartment buildings in the
former ‘socialist’ bloc, those in Ukraine were often built
with no individual gas meters or thermostats. This has led
to huge waste, as individual users have no abilitydand no
ﬁnancial incentivedto control their energy use. Yet
despite this inefﬁciency, the energy ﬂow must continue,
especially considering the brutal cold of a Ukrainian
winter. Again, this deepens Ukraine’s dependence on
Russian oil and gas.
The Ukraine’s reliance on Russian natural gas was a
particularly strong form of dependence. With very limited
domestic supplies, Kiev typically receives about three-
quarters of its natural gas from Russian pipelines.5 Worse
yet, there are no good substitutes for this gas. Oil is a much
more fungible product, with a clear world market price. It
can be imported in tankers relatively cheaply from any-
where in the world. This limits Russia’s ability to use oil as
an energy weapon. Gas, in contrast, is difﬁcult to ship
except through pipelines. It is possible to produce liqueﬁed
natural gas (LNG) for transport, but this demands special-
ized LNG production facilities and port facilities and is4 For decades, the USSR used a similar strategy to bind Eastern Europe
to the Warsaw Pact, offering cheap oil and gas in return for political
loyalty. See for example Marrese & Vanous (1983).
5 In typical years between 2000 and 2011, Ukraine produced about 18
Billion Cubic Meters (BCM) of natural gas, while importing about 60 BCM.
Thus its import percentage was usually about 77%. Statistics from U.S.
Energy Information Agency (www.eia.gov) and author’s calculations.
6 Shortly before leaving ofﬁce, he even arranged for the Ukrainian
Court of Appeals to formally investigate Soviet leaders of the 1930s on
charges of genocide. See Yushchenko (2010).
7 This word is controversial, and is often rejected in Russia, as it literally
means “killing by hunger,” and thus implies that some deliberate agency
was at work in the deaths.
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Ukraine found itself forced to rely on Russian gas. And the
Kremlin was well aware of this.
In the years before the Orange Revolution of 2004, the
Kremlin began to use its energy supplies as incentives, to
support the relatively friendly government of President
Leonid Kuchma. For years Russia kept gas prices absurdly
low, charging Ukraine only about $50 per thousand cubic
meters (TCM) until 2004, far less than the $235/TCM it then
charged its customers in Western Europe. Furthermore,
Moscow allowed Ukraine other advantages. It let Kiev buy
even cheaper natural gas from Turkmenistan through the
Russian pipeline systemdsomething it had no obligation to
do. It also allowed Kiev to take a large amount of gas as
payment for allowing Russia to ship gas through the
country to Western Europe. In all, on the eve of the Orange
Revolution, Moscow was sending 60 billion cubic meters
(BCM) of gas to Ukraine yearly. Yet of that, 37 BCM was
Turkmen gas and around 17 BCM was provided free as a
‘transit fee,’ meaning that Ukraine had to pay Russia for
only ten percent of the gas it received (about 6–8 BCM)
(Russia, 2005). And on top of generous pricing and supply
policies, Russia offered generous credits to cover even this
modest cost. For years Moscow complained only weakly as
Kiev piled up unpaid gas debts.
The fact that this generous policy was politically moti-
vated was clear behind the scenes. For example, in August
2004, shortly before the end of his term, President Kuchma
was able to negotiate an agreement with Moscow con-
ﬁrming the heavily subsidized gas deal. In return for a one-
time Ukrainian payment of $1.62 billion, to settle past
debts, Gazprom agreed to continue exporting gas for only
$50/TCM for ﬁve more years, the duration of the next
Presidential term in Ukraine (Stern, 2006:37–38). Many
regarded this as just one part of Russia’s overwhelming
effort to ensure that Kuchma’s designated successor, Viktor
Yanukovych, would win the upcoming election (Kuzio,
2005). However, unfortunately for the Kremlin this plan
went awry.
3. The Orange Revolution: a tempting target
As the end of President Kuchma’s second term in ofﬁce
neared in 2004, his increasingly heavy-handed rule led to
rising opposition. A prominent opposition journalist was
murdered, and the President was recorded covertly as he
joked about the case. Leaders of the emerging Orange
Coalition, former Premier Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia
Tymoshenko, were relentlessly harassed. Tymoshenko was
arrested on trumped-up charges and her husband was
forced to go into hiding for two years. Yushchenko faced an
even harsher fate: he was poisoned with dioxin during the
election campaign and nearly died. His face remains dis-
ﬁgured by the poisoning attempt, believed bymany to have
been carried out by Kuchma’s secret service, possibly with
the help of the Russian FSB.
The 2004 election campaign in Ukraine was, not sur-
prisingly, bitter and tumultuous. The country was closely
divided; Yushchenko, candidate of the Orange Coalition,
was intensely popular in Western Ukraine and among the
youth and intelligentsia. Yanukovych, head of the Party ofRegions and Kuchma’s designated successor, was strongly
supported by Eastern Ukraine and the Crimea (regions
historically tied to Russia) as well as many older and blue-
collar voters. In the climactic runoff election of November
21, 2004, the Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine
initially announced a Yanukovych victory. Russia rushed to
support this claim, although Western observers had docu-
mented widespread fraud. The Orange forces, refusing to
accept this result, called on their supporters to occupy the
capital. Up to 500,000 protesters braved the bitter Ukrai-
nian December weather for weeks, until Kuchma ﬁnally
gave in and consented to a second runoff election, held on
December 26, 2004. This time, with much less fraud,
Yushchenko emerged triumphant, by a fairly decisive
margin of 51.99% to 44.20% (Central). He ofﬁcially began his
ﬁve year term on January 23, 2005.
Russia was bitterly disappointed. Not only had its cho-
sen candidate lost, but the opposition victory had come in a
way which deeply worried the Kremlin. It saw a series of
“Color Revolutions” sweeping the world between 2000 and
2005, including the defeat of its ally Slobodan Milosevic in
Yugoslavia, the ‘Cedar Revolution’ in Lebanon, ‘Rose Revo-
lution’ in Georgia, and ‘Tulip Revolution’ in Kirghizstan. In
each case a massive popular mobilization, supported by the
West, had swept away undemocratic regimes, many of
them closely tied to Russia. These revolutions not only
diminished Moscow’s clout in the world; they also served
as a possible model for the overthrow of President Putin
himself. This existential fear helped to motivate a harsh
crackdown on critics within Russia at the time, and also
helps explain Moscow’s extreme reaction to the election of
Yushchenko.
After Yushchenko’s victory, the Kremlin’s fears were
realized. On issue after issue, the new leader moved the
Ukraine into sharp political conﬂict with the Kremlin.
Some of the disputes were little noticed in the West, yet
of great signiﬁcance for Moscow. For example, Yushchenko
often denounced the famine of the early 1930s as a case of
genocide against the Ukrainian people.6 When Stalin
imposed collectivization on Soviet agriculture, the country’s
breadbasket, the Ukraine, suffered millions of deathsdan
event known in the country as the holodomor.7 Even today
elderly survivors can recall events out of a nightmare, with
widespread cannibalism and corpse-ladenwagons clearing
out peasant houses where all the inhabitants had died. The
Ukrainewas hit harder in these events than other regions of
theUSSR, a factwhich ledmanynationalists to believe itwas
being punished for its past disobedience toMoscow(such as
its short-lived independence during the post-1917 Russian
Civil War). Resentment over the holodomor helped fuel the
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), founded with German
help duringWWII, an anti-Soviet guerilla movementwhich
held on in the forests of the Western Ukraine for a decade
R.E. Newnham / Journal of Eurasian Studies 4 (2013) 115–122118after the war.8 An accusation of genocide carries heavy
weight in international affairs. This accusation was espe-
cially resented by the Kremlin, since Russia has historically
seen itself as a victim of genocide (during theWWII German
invasion), not a perpetrator.
Similarly, in a related historical controversy, Yush-
chenko sided with hard-line Ukrainian nationalists in
honoring the memory of Stepan Bandera, the leader of the
UPA. Statues of him were put in place throughout Western
Ukraine, a postage stamp was issued for his 100th birthday
in 2009, and in January 2010 Yushchenko awarded him the
title “Hero of Ukraine” (Levy, 2010a). All of these steps
infuriated the Kremlin leadership, which saw Bandera as a
brutal terrorist who had killed many Russians and collab-
orated with the Nazis.
More importantly, though, Yushchenko sought to turn
his country away from Russia in geopolitical terms. Yush-
chenko lobbied hard throughout his term for Ukraine to be
admitted to NATO and the EU, often in cooperation with
Georgia, the Kremlin’s other bête noir among the ex-Soviet
states. The Orange leader added insult to injury in the
Kremlin’s eyes by rushing to the side of the Georgian
President, Mikhail Saakashvili, when Russia attacked
Georgia in the summer of 2008.
Finally, an especially divisive issue between Kiev and
Moscow was the huge Russian naval base at Sevastopol in
the Crimea. The base was a thorn in the side of Ukrainian
nationalists, which saw it as a form of military occupation
and a threat to their national sovereignty. This was partic-
ularly true since Moscow seemed to be encouraging the
many ethnic Russians in the Crimea to try to return the
region to Russiadwhich had ruled there until 1954, when
Nikita Khrushchev (a Ukrainian) had transferred the
peninsula to the Ukraine. For the Russians, on the other
hand, the base is a vital strategic asset. It is the main base of
the Russian Black Sea ﬂeet, important for projecting Rus-
sia’s power not only theredas seen during the war against
Georgiadbut beyond the region, into the Mediterranean
and Middle East.9 Russia’s role as a world power thus de-
pends in an important way on the Crimean base.
Unfortunately for the Kremlin, after years of wrangling
in the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR, the Ukraine
had agreed to only a short-term Russian lease on the base.
The agreement was set to expire in 2017. While this may
have seemed fairly distant when Yushchenko took ofﬁce in
early 2005, it loomed ever closer as his term progressed
and he remained ﬁrmly opposed to extending the lease. It
would be very difﬁcult for Russia’s smaller ports on the
Black SeadSochi and Novorossiyskdto accommodate the
ﬂeet’s many large vessels and repair yards. Relocating the
Russian Black Sea ﬂeet would cost billions and take many
years; Moscow would need to start a huge building project
immediately if the lease was not renewed.8 Perhaps not surprisingly, this region is the heartland of the Orange
Movement today.
9 For example, the Black Sea ﬂeet is vital in maintaining Russia’s
presence at its only remaining naval base outside the former USSR, at the
port of Tartus in Syria. Russia’s presence there was of great importance
when the Syrian revolt against the Assad regime erupted in 2011–12.Yet Moscow also saw that their strident opponent,
Yushchenko, was highly vulnerable. In addition to his
country’s economic vulnerability, noted above, Yushchenko
had personal political weaknesses that could be exploited.
He was genuinely unpopular with half of the country,
having only narrowly defeated Yanukovych in the two
tightly contested 2004 runoff elections. And his own coa-
litionwas very delicate. His key partner, Yulia Tymoshenko,
was an important leader in her own right and had clear
ambitions to run the country. When the Orange Movement
installed him as President and her as Premier, this seeming
‘dream team’ was in fact highly contentious. Within
months of their victory Tymoshenko resigned as Premier,
splitting the Orange Coalition. Thus, evenmodest economic
sanctions had the potential to harm Yushchenko politically,
encouraging the strong rivals both inside and outside of his
movement.
4. Russian energy sanctions
The threat of Russian energy sanctions dogged Yush-
chenko from the moment he took ofﬁce. In fact, such
sanctions had been threatened during the 2004 election
campaigns. As one pro-Russian Ukrainian leader said at the
time “what else but gas could convince the people of
Ukraine that it’s better to be a friend of Russia than the EU
and NATO?” (Yasmann, 2006). Similarly, Vladimir Putin
himself said in September 2004 that Yushchenko was
welcome to seek a closer alliance with the West and turn
his back on Russia, but he should understand that if he did
so, Russia was under no obligation to continue to subsidize
its energy exports to Ukraine (Goldman, 2008:144).
With the victory of the Orange forces, such threats soon
became real. As noted above, Ukraine had enjoyed generous
energy subsidies from Moscow for years. This ended
abruptly. After ﬁfteen years of stable prices Moscow sud-
denly demanded that Kiev pay the same amount it charged
its West European customers, then about $235/TCM as
compared to $50/TCM. This would have more than
quadrupledUkraine’s natural gas bill overnight. The Kremlin
also took a hard line with the Ukrainians on the payment of
energy debts, which it had previously often ignored.
When Ukraine’s annual contract for Russian gas expired
at the end of 2005 and a new agreement had not been
reachedMoscowdecided toplay hardball. It simplycutoff all
gas shipments to the countryon January1, 2006, a suddenact
which shocked theworld. In the past Russia had never dared
to cut off gas shipments, since fully 80% of Russian gas
ﬂowing to Western Europe went through the Ukraine
(Ukraine, 2006:204, 220). However, the Kremlin’s hatred of
Yushchenko trumped even this consideration. For three days
Europe held its breath as, in the depths of a frigid winter,
millions of Ukrainian households lost their heat, factories
ground to a halt, andWest European gas supplies also began
to plummet. The exercise in brinksmanship paid off, as
Ukrainewas forced to agree topay$95/TCMforgas in2006.1010 In fact, the deal was even more beneﬁcial to Moscow: the higher price
was arrived at by ofﬁcially ‘mixing’ cheap gas from Central Asia, costing
only about $65/TCM, with gas brought from Russia at the $230/TCM
ﬁgure demanded by the Kremlin. Source: Country (2007:6).
11 Figures in this paragraph from CIA (2010).
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Russian pressure on Yushchenkodit was only the begin-
ning. For the rest of his term tension was constant. Every
year the natural gas agreement brought new problems, as
Russia demanded ever higher prices. Prices shot up from
$77/TCM in 2005 to $95 in 2006, $130 in 2007, and $160 in
2008 (Pirani, 2011:26). Yet even between these yearly ne-
gotiations there were new threats, seemingly on an almost
daily basis. There were always new demands about pay-
ments for past gas debts. When to pay, how much, under
what conditions? Similarly, there were constant demands
for more control of key industries in Ukraine, and especially
for a Russian role in running the Ukrainian gas pipelines,
the lifeline to Europe.
InMarch, 2008, for example, Russia cut gas shipments to
Ukraine by 50% over another dispute (Gazprom, 2008).
Analysts generally regarded this action as retribution for
the return of Yulia Tymoshenko as Premier of Ukraine in
December, 2007. As noted above, she had broken with
Yushchenko in 2005. By returning to an alliance with
Yushchenko, she was again strengthening the Orange
Movement, which angered the Kremlin.
Later in 2008, yet another dispute over pricing and
credit terms threatened to cause a second complete shut-
down in gas shipments to Ukrainedand to Western
Europe. This dispute was particularly bitter due to Yush-
chenko’s decision to openly back Georgia in its war with
Russia in summer 2008. The Ukrainian leader did not
merely support Georgian President Saakashvili with words.
He helped organize several other leaders–including the
Presidents of all three Baltic States and Polanddto ﬂy to
Tbilisi in the midst of the conﬂict to stand demonstratively
at Saakashvili’s side as he stridently condemned Moscow
(Yushchenko, 2008).
As a result, the Russian leadership again decided to
punish Ukraine harshly. As in 2006, it cut off all gas ship-
ments promptly on January 1, 2009. This time, though, it
maintained the embargo for much longer. Further alien-
ating the Kremlin, Yushchenko openly appealed to the
European Union and other Western leaders to intervene.
The conﬂict was not ﬁnally resolved until January 19,
almost three weeks later.
In the end, Russia ﬁnally achieved the result it had been
seeking since Yushchenko took ofﬁce. The Ukrainians were
forced to agree to pay the same price for their gas as
Western Europe from 2010 onwards, although Russia did
allow a 20% discount for 2009 (Russia, 2009). With this
agreement, Kiev went from paying $180/TCM in 2008 to
$233 in 2009 and $257 in 2010 (Pirani, 2011:26). In all, then,
from 2005 to 2010 the price paid by Ukraine for Russian
natural gas had quintupleddrisen by over 500%–from $50
to $257/TCM.
In fact, Ukrainian leaders alleged, the “European” price
used in the 2009 agreement was actually sometimes higher
than that charged to Western states such as Germany.
Ironically, Kiev recently negotiated an agreement with the
German gas supplier RWE, which allows it to buy back
Russian gas from Germany when the price that country
pays is lower than the Ukrainian price (Ukraine, 2012).
The impact of the years of Russian energy sanctions
against Ukraine was clear, both psychologically andphysically. First, factories and homeowners could never be
sure when their energy lifeline would be cut. This had an
enormous demoralizing effect, especially in the depth of an
East European winter. Fear of winter cold rests deep in the
peoples of the former USSR, rooted in the privations of
WWII and the harsh years that preceded it. The demoral-
izing effect extended to foreign investors. Who would want
to invest in a country that seemed unstable, that might
even be attacked by its powerful and hostile neighbor?
The immediate economic effects of the energy sanc-
tions, both short and long term, were just as dramatic.
During the 2006 and 2009 shutdowns factories across
Ukraine stopped production, costing the national economy
dearly (Nesterov, 2009). Even when gas ﬂowed, the vastly
higher costs rippled through the economy in a dangerous
way. The Ukrainian government faced a difﬁcult choice:
should it pass on the huge price increases to the people and
the factories? This could lead to immediate rioting. Instead,
Kiev chose to mask many of the costs by borrowing more,
thus greatly harming the government’s ﬁscal stability. By
the end of Yushchenko’s term, Kiev was frantically begging
the IMF for loans. One key condition the IMF demanded
was that the government greatly increase the retail price of
gas to Ukrainian consumers, a politically unpopular step
which Yushchenko had been avoiding. Yet even in the face
of bankruptcy, today the Ukraine continues to refuse to
raise household gas rates, clearly showing the extreme
political sensitivity of gas prices.
Finally, of course, there was the direct drain on the
Ukrainian government and economy posed by the
increased cost of gas payments. The exact amount paid is
difﬁcult to measure: many of the deals were complex and
opaque, with both sides working through intermediary
companies andwith cheaper andmore expensive gas being
ofﬁcially ‘mixed’ in the pipeline. Also, the Ukraine oftenwas
behind on its payments, with the amount owed constantly
in dispute. Perhaps the best estimates available are from
the Oxford University Institute for Energy Studies (Pirani,
Stern & Yaﬁmeva, 2010:9). These analysts calculate that
Ukraine paid Russia $3.2 billion for natural gas in 2005, and
that this rose to $5.1 billion in 2006, $6.5 billion in 2007,
and $8.6 billion in 2008. With the sharp decline in the
Ukraine’s economy is 2009, imports fell slightly in 2009,
with payments declining to about $6.2 billion. However,
even with the economy still in recession, costs rebounded
to a record $9.3 billion in 2010. Considering that, by com-
parison, the Ukraine’s entire government budget amounts
to only $40 billion, this suggests that Russian gas costs are a
major drain on the country (CIA, 2010).
During Yushchenko’s last year in ofﬁce, the Ukrainian
economy went into a steep nosedive. This was not, of
course, due entirely to the effect of Russian sanctions; the
entire world faced a challenging economic climate at the
time. Yet Ukraine fared far worse than others; in 2009 its
GDP plummeted by 15%.11 Its per capita GNP fell from about
$7400 to $6300. Only one country in the world saw a
steeper decline in national GDP than Ukraine that
yeardLithuaniadand it, not coincidentally, was also
R.E. Newnham / Journal of Eurasian Studies 4 (2013) 115–122120affected by Russian energy sanctions. The ruinously high
amounts paid for Russian gas clearly played a notable role
in Ukraine’s economic problems. For example, as the IMF
struggled to put together a rescue package for Ukraine, it
factored in the amount the government had to pay to cover
the operating deﬁcit of the national gas company, Naftogaz.
In 2009 this amounted to 3.2% of Ukraine’s GDP, higher
than the country’s ofﬁcial budget deﬁcit (2.3% of GDP) (IMF,
2009).
By comparison, states favored by Russia did much bet-
ter. Belarus, for example, a loyal supporter of Moscow, had
beneﬁtted from years of Russian economic incentives.12 It
weathered the world economic downturn relatively well,
with its GNP falling by only 0.2% in 2009. Its per capita GNP
actually rose, from an estimated $12,400 to $12,500. This
performance has certainly helped the generally pro-
Russian leader of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, to
remain ﬁrmly in the saddle.
In contrast, as the literature cited above would predict, a
leader who is in power when the economy is weak will
suffer at the polls. This has been demonstrated again in the
U.S. since 2008, as President Obama’s popularity has waxed
and waned in tandem with the ups and downs of a ﬁtful
economic recovery. And it was clear that the situation
President Yushchenko faced in 2009–10 was even more
serious than that faced by Obama. Thus, as one would
expect, the popular reaction against his rule was corre-
spondingly strong. If we use Markus’ ﬁgure, cited in the
theory section above, we would expect that each 1% eco-
nomic decline in the year before an election would cause
the incumbent to lose 1.9% of the vote; Erickson saw an
even larger effect, 2.77%. This would mean that, with
Ukraine’s disastrous 15% economic plunge in 2009, Presi-
dent Yushchenko could expect to see his share of the vote
fall by between 28.5 and 41.5%–or about 35%, if the two
predictions are averaged together. As we shall see, this was
in fact exactly what happened.
5. 2010: Regime change
The results of the 2010 Ukrainian Presidential elections
seemed to vindicate Moscow’s harsh policy against
Yushchenko’s governmentdand to conﬁrm the accuracy
of this study’s theoretical predictions. As the ﬁrst round of
the election approached, commentators were unanimous
in their view that the incumbent had absolutely no
chance to prevail. Opinion polls derided his management
of the economy and showed his popularity in the single
digits. The ﬁrst round results conﬁrmed this, with Yush-
chenko mustering a meager 5.45%, ﬁnishing ﬁfth in a
crowded ﬁeld of candidates (Central). Clearly the in-
cumbent’s former popularity was long gone, and ob-
servers agreed that the Clinton-era maxim “It’s the
Economy, Stupid” had played a large role in this.
Compared to his performance in the multicandidate ﬁrst
round of the 2004 elections, Yushchenko had fallen by an12 Like Ukraine before 2004, it receives gas at lower prices and also is
able to sell its uncompetitive products to Russia, as it did before the
breakup of the USSR. In January 2010 Belarus entered into a customs
union with Russia and Kazakhstan.extraordinary 34.45% (from 39.9 to 5.45%). This is almost
exactly the average of Erickson and Markus’ predictions
noted above (35%).
An easy victory for the opposition candidate, Yanuko-
vych, was prevented, however, by the presence on the
ballot of Yulia Tymoshenko, Yushchenko’s former partner
in the Orange Coalition. Although Tymoshenko had served
as Prime Minister twice under Yushchenko, she had
distanced herself from the President, enabling her to try to
pose as a force for change, albeit a safer one than Yanuko-
vych. Tymoshenko was able to inherit many of the Orange
Coalition’s former supporters and give Yanukovych a spir-
ited ﬁght in the second round (runoff) election, although
most observers believed she had little chance of prevailing.
Indeed, in the end Yanukovychwon a fairly decisive victory,
48.95% to 45.47%, outpolling Tymoshenko by almost a
million votes (Central).
With the victory of Yanukovych, Russia could reap the
rewards of its successful efforts to destabilize the Ukrainian
regime.Withinweeks the new President made concessions
to Moscow on all of the important controversies discussed
above, completely changing the country’s geopolitical
orientation. The importance of energy in this reorientation
was againmade clear whenMoscow rewarded Yanukovych
with a sharp drop in natural gas prices.
Some of the new leader’s concessions dealt with sym-
bolic historical issuesdyet they were much appreciated by
Moscow. The Russians were pleased when President
Yanukovych withdrew the accusation that the holodomor
had been a form of genocide, noting instead that all the
peoples of the USSRdincluding Russiansdhad suffered
from Stalin’s collectivization drive (Ukraine, 2010a). Simi-
larly, when Yanukovych took ofﬁce, his administration
swiftly canceled the “Hero of Ukraine” award which
Yushchenko had given to the anti-Soviet guerilla leader
Stepan Bandera (Levy, 2011).13
Most important to the Kremlin, however, were Yanu-
kovych’s two major geopolitical concessions to Moscow:
halting Ukraine’s attempt to reorient toward the West
(especially the effort to enter NATO) and allowing Russia to
retain its important naval base in the country.
Shortly after taking power Yanukovych traveled to
Brussels and Strasbourg to announce his country’s geopo-
litical reorientation. As noted above, Yushchenko had lob-
bied hard to support Ukraine’s admission into NATO, along
with the Kremlin’s sworn enemy, Georgia. Yanukovych now
abruptly announced that this effort was over (Ukraine,
2010b). Similarly, although he did not ofﬁcially renounce
joining the EU as an eventual goal, for all intents and pur-
poses that effort was ended as well. Certainly Yanukovych’s
decision to arrest Tymoshenko on what are widely regar-
ded in theWest as bogus charges hasmade it impossible for
Brussels to even consider accession negotiations with Kiev
(Reaction, 2011).
Finally, however, perhaps the most important conces-
sion made by the new President to Moscow concerned the
highly controversial issue of the Russian naval base in the13 The decree was suspended by court order in spring, 2010, although
appeals dragged out the formal annulment of the award for almost a year.
14 Of course, as the 2009 elections in Iran showeddlike the 2004
elections in Ukrainedin some cases ruling groups may try to ﬁnd ways to
falsify election results. However, such efforts sometimes fail, as President
Kuchma discovered in 2004. In any case, such manipulation carries a
heavy price in lost legitimacy.
15 The pro-western President of Serbia, Boris Tadic, elected in 2004, was
widely believed to owe much of his success to the huge economic boost
Serbs can expect to receive if they join the EU. Serbs were rewarded for
their support of Tadic by being granted visa-free travel to EU states, and
Serbia was ofﬁcially accepted as a candidate for EU membership in March
2012. Interestingly, as the Eurozone –and Serbia–struggled economically
after 2008, Tadic lost support, and was denied another term in May 2012.
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Yanukovych signed the Kharkov Agreement with President
Medvedev of Russia. This pact granted the Russians a 25
year extension on the lease of their Sevastopol base. Slated
to expire in 2017, the lease would now run until 2042, with
an additional ﬁve year renewal option (Levy, 2010b).
The role of ‘petro-diplomacy’was glaringly obvious in the
negotiations on the new treaty. In fact, the treaty talks had
begunwhen Yanukovych sent his PrimeMinister and Energy
Minister to Moscow to ask for a cut in gas prices (Big, 2010).
Moscow decided to reward Yanukovych for his loyalty by
cutting the price the Ukraine would pay for Russian natural
gas by thirty percent for the next 10 years (a beneﬁt which
could save the Ukraine about $40 billion) (Barry, 2010).
Including this provision openly in the new agreement was
galling to the Orange forces, who felt that their country was
being sold out for the proverbial ‘thirty pieces of silver.’ They
protested vehemently in the Ukrainian Rada (Parliament),
pelting the Speaker with eggs and smoke bombs. Despite
this, Yanukovych’s party was able to rush through ratiﬁca-
tion of the Kharkov Agreement only six days after it was
signed (Protests, 2010). Russia’s decision to directly link the
base lease and gas prices, while perhaps crass, ﬁts the classic
theory of economic sanctions: if the target state concedes,
sanctions can quickly become economic incentives, to
reward the target’s ‘improved’ behavior.
All in all, the result of the 2010 elections and the con-
cessions made by the new government make Russia’s pol-
icy of energy sanctions look quite successful in this case. Of
course, many in the Westdand in Ukrainedare critical.
Even in Russia, some opposition ﬁgures have questioned
the policy. For example, Boris Nemtsov of the Union of
Right Forces criticized the Kharkov Agreement for costing
Russia an estimated $40 billion over 10 years. The main
reason for maintaining the Sevastopol base, he argued, was
the war with Georgia. Was keeping Georgia in check, he
asked, really worth $40 billion? (Boris, 2010). However, it
could be argued that Nemtsov’s view was too narrow: the
Kremlin was not paying that amount just to maintain its
naval base. It was paying to maintain a pro-Russian Presi-
dent in Ukraine, which resulted (in the Kremlin’s view) in a
fundamental improvement in Russia’s geopolitical position
in the world.
6. Conclusion
As we have seen in this paper, Russia has clearly used its
energy resources to carry out a series of economic in-
centives and sanctions designed to combat the Orange
Revolution in Ukraine and bring a more pliant leadership to
power. First it used economic incentives to support the
friendly Kuchma regime and try to bring his chosen suc-
cessor, Yanukovych, to power. When that failed, the
Kremlin turned to sanctions, systematically undermining
the Ukrainian economy during the Yushchenko years. In
the end, this effort seemed to succeed, leaving the Ukrai-
nian President deeply unpopular and helping to bring
Yanukovych to power in the 2010 elections. At that point,
Russia could resume its policy of economic incentives,
rewarding Yanukovych for his cooperation with lower en-
ergy prices.This case seems to ﬁt well with the existing literature on
economic sanctions and on the role of economics in elec-
tions, as described brieﬂy at the start of this study. As
predicted by Hufbauer and others, economic sanctions can
cause ‘pain’ to the population and turn them against their
rulers, leading to new policies. And as shown by authors
such as Erickson and Markus, economic decline has a spe-
ciﬁc, measurable negative impact on an incumbent leader’s
chance of re-election, as Viktor Yushchenko found out–to
his regret.
The relevance of this conclusion for real-world politics is
clear. The U.S. and others are constantly using various forms
of economic leverage. Often, as for example with the
sanctions imposed against Iran, the state targeted has some
sort of democratic or quasi-democratic system. In Iran
there have often been important contested elections be-
tween anti-Western fundamentalists and reform candi-
dates. This paper has shown that sanctions do not have to
force the country to collapse: they just have to cause
enough economic ‘pain’ to force the Islamic hard-liners to
lose elections.14 This is an important point: a major criti-
cism of sanctions has been that if they are designed to
target a country’s entire economy, they can cause a hu-
manitarian disaster, as took place in Iraq from 1991 to 2003,
when harsh sanctions targeted Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Yet this paper argues that sanctions do not have to bring
economic collapse to be effective; they may only have to
lower a target state’s GNP by a few percent, enough to cause
a leader to lose an election.
Alternatively, as the EU has shown in its relations with
countries like Serbia, states can follow the more positive
tactic now being used by the Russians in Ukraine:
rewarding favored leaders by boosting their states’ econo-
mies to try to help them win elections.15 Again, this could
potentially be a relatively ‘cost-effective’ tactic. One does
not have to totally rebuild a country or ﬂood it with billions
of dollars in aid–just boost the target state’s economy by a
crucial few percent when an election is near. In either case,
as this paper has attempted to show, such tactics can
potentially be effective. Ideally, future research will be able
to show that they can be effective in measurable and pre-
dictable ways.
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